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Sole Appellant.
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IN THE

S u p r e m e Court
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TRACY LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
vs.
FRANCIS G. LUKE AND NELLIE
LUKE, his wife; ALICE G. LUKE;
L. C. LOHDEFRINCK AND JANE
DOE LOHDEFRINCK, his wife;
LINUS E. PATTERSON and PETE
LENDARIS,
Defendants.
SAID NELLIE LUKE,
Sole Appellant.

NO. 4704

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF CASE
Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke were owners in
common of the real estate involved in this foreclosure.
Nellie Luke, the appellant, was and is the wife of Francis G. Luke. The mortgage in favor of respondent, Tracy
Loan & Trust Company, which is the subject of this
proceeding, is dated December 1,1917, and was properly
executed by said Francis G. Luke and Nellie Luke, his
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wife, and Alice Gr. Luke. The coupon note in the principal sum of $1300.00 secured by this mortgage was also
signed by the said Francis G. Luke and Nellie Luke, his
wife, and the said Alice G. Luke. The real property was
burdened with a mortgage in the principal sum of
$1300.00 in favor of respondent when the same was conveyed to Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke. The mortgage of December 1, 1917 was clearly a renewal mortgage, as it is recited therein. The respondent is foreclosing this mortgage dated December 1st, 1917, executed
by the parties aforesaid. It is alleged by the respondent
in its complaint, and so found by the court, (Findings
9, 10, 11,'Abs. 24 and 25) that the notes and mortgage
dated December 1, 1920 and the notes and mortgage
dated December 1, 1923, evidenced the same indebtedness as the mortgage dated December 1,1917 in favor of
this respondent and are evidences of the various extensions of time granted by the respondent, and the defendants Francis G. Luke and Nellie Luke, his wife, and Alice
G. Luke, have at all times recognized and acknowledged
said indebtedness and have agreed to pay the same, and
that said defendants have paid interest on said mortgage
from time to time and have in writing undertaken and
agreed to pay said mortgage indebtedness.
The interest of the respondent Nellie Luke was and
is that interest created by Section 6406 Compiled Laws
of Utah, 1917. She is not and never has been a fee simple
title owner of the mortgaged premises. The decree of
the District Court in foreclosure, foreclosed not only
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the fee title interest of the defendant Francis G. Luke
and Alice G. Luke, but also that inchoate right of Nellie
Luke as wife of the defendant Francis G. Luke. There is
no question but that the mortgage obligation was due
and owing by the actual fee title owners of the premises.
They have not appealed from the foreclosure judgment.
Only Nellie Luke, the wife of Francis G. Luke, has appealed. The fee title owners accepted the judgment of
the District Court and by virtue of the sale thereunder,
lose all title and interest in the premises.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS IS AN APPEAL ON THE JUDGMENT
ROLL ALONE WHICH CONTAINS NO BILL OF
EXCEPTIONS. IN SUCH AN APPEAL THE
PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE EVIDENCE
JUSTIFIED THE FINDINGS.
McGuire vs. State Bank of Tremonton,
164 Pac. 494
49 Utah 381
Raphael vs. Wasatch and J. V. R.
95 Pac. 1008
34 Utah 97
Ryan vs. Kunkel
90 Pac. 1079
32 Utah 377
The court's attention is directed to Finding of Fact
No. 15:
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XV.
That the fee simple to said land is vested in
Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke * * * and is
subject to the prior lien o fthe mortgage in favor
of plaintiff, dated December 1, 1917, * # * which
said lien of said mortgage has been kept an existing and legally enforceable lien against said land
by the written agreements of Francis Gr. Luke
and Nellie Luke, his wife, and defendant Alice Gr.
Luke. That the inchoate interest of defendant
Nellie Luke, wife of Francis Gr. Luke, is subject
to the lien of plaintiff's mortgage # * *. That
defendant Nellie Luke, wife of Francis G. Luke,
did specifically relinquish her inchoate right as
the wife of the defendant, Francis G. Luke, in
said property, by the execution and delivery unto
plaintiff, December 1, 1917, of the mortgage described in paragraph VII hereof.
It will be noticed that the court found that the inchoate interest of the appellant Nellie Luke is subject
to the lien of plaintiff's (respondent's) mortgage and
that said appellant did specifically relinquish her inchoate right as wife of the defendant Francis G. Luke
in said property by execution and delivery unto the respondent of the mortgage dated December 1, 1917. By
Conclusion of Law No. 4, Abs. 29, the court specifically
concludes that said respondent Nellie Luke renounced
her inchoate right in the mortgaged premises by proper
written instrument. In view of the type of this appeal,
it is submitted to the court that this Finding and Conclusion is conclusive against the appellant. It is presumed that the evidence justified the Finding. This
Finding is a complete answer to the argument of appel-
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lant that there was no Finding on the Statute of Limitations. The court found that the inchoate right of the
appellant Nellie Luke was subject to the lien of plaintiff's mortgage sought to be foreclosed. This was an
affirmative Finding. It was not required of the court
that it find specifically that the lien of the mortgage
was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, inasmuch
as this affirmative Finding in itself shows conclusively
that the mortgage was an enforcible lien obligation, not
only as to the fee title owners, but also as to the inchoate
interest of the appellant. In the state of the record and
aippeal, the appellant cannot question this Finding. It
is conclusive against her. The Finding was within the
issue raised by respondent's complaint and the answer
of said appellant. If the lien of the mortgage had been
barred by the Statute of Limitations, then ipso facto it
would not have been a lien on the inchoate interest of
appellant. Therefore the Finding that said mortgage
was an enforcible lien against the inchoate interest of
appellant included a Finding that the defense of the
Statute of Limitations was not sustained.

II.
THE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL IS NOT
WHETHER THE PAYMENT OR ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY ONE MAKER OF A JOINT AND
SEVERAL PROMISSORY NOTE TOLLS THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS TO ANOTHER
MAKER. THE RESPONDENT DID NOT PRAY
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FOR A DEFICIENCY AGAINST NELLIE LUKE.
NO SUCH DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AGAINST HER. THE ISSUE ON THIS
APPEAL IS WHETHER THE LIEN OF THE
MORTGAGE HEREIN SOUGHT TO BE FORECLOSED AS AGAINST THE INCHOATE RIGHT
OF THE APPELLANT, AS WIFE OF THE DEFENDANT, FRANCIS G. LUKE, WAS RELEASED OR DESTROYED BECAUSE THE PERSONAL OBLIGATION OF APPELLANT ON THE
NOTE DATED DECEMBER 1, 1917 AND SIGNED BY HER WAS BARRED.
The solution of the problem in this case will depend
upon the proper construction of Section 6406, Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1917, reading in part as follows:
"One-third in value of all of the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the
husband at any time during the marriage AND
TO WHICH THE WIFE HAD MADE NO RELINQUISHMENT OF HER RIGHTS, shall be
be set apart as her property in fee simple, if she
survives him, etc."
The right of the wife in the real property of the
husband DURING THE LIFE OF THE HUSBAND
under this Section, is not a new right, created by statute.
The statute simply enlarged the right that had been continuous in the Territory of Utah and in the State of
Utah since 1887. When common law dower was reinstated in the Territory it was simply declaratory of a
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right that existed. The same pre-requisites which gave
and vested the right are necessary under this Section as
are necessary under the common law dower as the same
is applied in most States of the Union, namely, marriage,
siezen by, and death of husband. Moreover, the amount
or quantity given to the widow is the same in the one as
in the other, the only difference being in the extent of its
use. Under the law prior to the enactment of this Section, the use was limited for the life of the widow, while
under this Section it is enlarged to a fee simple estate.
The one was limited; the other unlimited, and this is the
only difference between the right prior to and after the
enactment of this Section. The above statement is a
paraphrase of the language of the court used in the famous case of
Hilton vs. Thatcher
88 Pac. 20
31 Utah 360.
It is a classic case defining the rights of a wife and
widow in the real property of her husband. Our Supreme
Court has had occasion to elaborate further its declaration as to the wife's and widow's interest: In
G-ee vs. Baum
196 Pac. 680
58 Utah 445.
the Court said:
'' While it is true that under our statute, dower by that name is abolished and the wife takes
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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one-third of her husband's real estate in fee if
she survives him, yet unless she does survive him
she has no interest in his real estate and the interest of the wife although in fee is nevertheless
a mere inchoate interest and depends entirely
upon the condition that she survive her husand."
In joining with him in a deed of lands to which he
holds the legal title, she therefore merely releases her
inchoate right and is not a grantor in the sense that she
is the owner or joint owner of the title conveyed. In
the case of
H. T. C. Co. vs. Whitehouse,
154 Pac. 950
47 Utah 323
our Supreme Court held that a wife during the life of
her husband had no title to nor possession of her husband's land. Her right is merely an inchoate interest
during the life of her husband. It will therefore be seen
from these decisions that the appellant Nellie Luke had
no title to the mortgaged premises; had no possession
of the same, but an inchoate interest only as long as her
husband, Francis G. Luke, lived. This inchoate interest
would ripen into a fee simple title should she survive
her husband, but dieing before her husband, this inchoate interest vanishes. The Supreme Court has said
that this interest is not an estate in real property, although it is an interest which the courts will carefully
protect. It was this right or interest which the District Court foreclosed as against the appellant. This
case was and is before the courts while the husband,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Francis G. Luke, lives. It is apparent, therefore, that
if the appellant Nellie Luke did relinquish her right or
interest in and to the mortgaged premises, then the
judgment of the lower court is correct. If there was
no relinquishment by the appellant, the District Court
judgment is clearly in error. We are not interested in any
personal liability of the appellant. There was no attempt
by the respondent to affix a personal liability upon her.
All it sought in its proceedings against appellant was to
foreclose its mortgage of 1917 against her inchoate interest under Section 6406. The mortgage sought to be
foreclosed was executed by the appellant. She was a
necessary and proper party to the action. The real question to be answered is this: Was the execution of the
mortgage of 1917 by the appellant such a relinquishment
of her inchoate interest as Section 6406 contemplates?
All other questions in this appeal are irrelevant. This
is the question which must be answered by the court,

III.
WHERE A WIFE JOINS IN A MORTGAGE
OF THE HUSBAND'S LANDS SECURING EITHER HIS OR THEIR DEBT, PAYMENTS MADE
BY HIM OR WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF THE DEBT MADE PRIOR TO BAR OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WILL SUSPEND THE
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE AS TO THE
WIFE'S INCHOATE DOWER RIGHT IN RE-
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SPECT TO FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE.
It is admitted that the obligation due the respondent was not barred as to the defendants Francis G.
Luke and/or Alice G. Luke. They made payments on
interest from time to time, and they executed renewal
notes and mortgages. At all times the same obligation
created by the 1917 notes and mortgage was valid and
enforcible as against the husband of this appellant. The
theory of respondent's action has been and is that while
any personal obligation of the appellant Nellie Luke
may have been barred by lapse of time, that she made
due and proper relinquishment of her inchoate interest
by the execution of the 1917 mortgage to secure the obligation recited therein and that so long as said obligation was due and owing the respondent just so long did
this inchoate interest of the appellant stand mortgaged
or pledged to the respondent. As before stated, the
obligation remained the same throughout the years. The
payment of the same was twice extended. It remained a
personal and enforcible obligation against the true fee
simple owners of the land. The rights of a wife during
the lifetime of her husband, in her husband's real property, under said Section 6406, are the same as at common
law.
Hilton vs. Thatcher (supra)
and therefore the decisions of other States will be of
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great aid and help. The question is not made peculiar
to the State of Utah, because of statutory regulation. In
the case of
Clift vs. Williams
51 SW. (Ky.)
at page 821, the court said:
" I t is clear that the wife having signed and
acknowledged the mortgage and released and
waived her dower and homestead right, cannot
claim dower in such lands by reason of the statute
above, as well as by reason of the fact that the
mortgage itself is not barred by limitation. The
widow's claim can only come through her husband and her right dates from! his death and in
no case where she signs the mortgage can she be
in a better position than the purchaser with constructive notice."
Im this case the court held that payments made on
a note secured by a mortgage operate to extend the
period of limitation as to the wife of the mortgagor who
united in the mortgage.
We quote from
Jackson vs. Longwell
64 Pac. (Kans.) 991
"The second contention is that inasmuch as
the statute of limitations has excused Mrs. Jackson from personal liability on the first note and
as the property mortgaged to secure that note
was her individual property, therefore no foreclosure could be had of the mortgage which secured that note. We cannot give this contention
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our approval. This note in question was a joint
and several obligation of both of the defendants.
Mrs. Jackson mortgaged her property not only to
secure the joint obligation of herself and husband, but the obligation of each severally. The
mortgage secured the obligation of the husband
as fully as it secured the obligation of the wife.
Of course, if the note had been barred as to both,
then there would have remained no obligation to
enforce; but until the obligation of both was discharged by payment or otherwise, the lien of the
mortgage remains enforcible. The statute of limitations having run in favor of Mrs. Jackson discharged her from her personal liability on the
note and therefore she sustained the same relation to the note as though she had never signed it;
but this in no way affected her agreement that her
property should be subjected to the payment of
her husband's debt evidenced by the note and the
case remained the same as though he only had
signed the note when it was made, and both had
at that time given a mortgage to secure the note."
In
Perry vs. Horack
64Pac. (Kans.) 990
the husband and wife executed a mortgage upon their
homestead. The husband died, leaving minor children
and the mother and children continued to occupy the
homestead. No payments were made on the note expressly for the children. Mrs. Horack made payments
on her own behalf.. The court said the payments by Mrs.
Horack certainly kept the note alive and the general
rule is that the mortgage lives as long as the note it was
given to secure.
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" T h e minors were not parties to the note and
mortgage but they inherited the land subject to
the lien of the mortgage. * * * Payment by Mrs.
Horack kept the debt alive and if we should treat
these payments as for herself alone the mortgage
would still be enforcible. If she alone had made
the note and the children had joined in a mortgage on their property to secure it and the debt
had been kept alive by payments of the maker,
no one would contend that the mortgage would be
barred as to the childen or that it would be affected by the failure to make payments or otherwise
acknowledge the existence of the debt."
See also the case of
Investment Securities Co. vs. Manwarren
68 Pac. (Kans.) 68
Here the court said:
" T h e fact that the property in this case is
shown to be the homestead of the mortgagors is
not important. It is the creation of the lien on
the homestead without the joint consent of both
husband and wife which is prohibited by the Constitution. Here such consent was given. The
mortgage debt has not been repaid. The husband
by payment of interest upon the debt within the
statutory period tolled the statute and preserved
the cause of action against himself upon the debt
and as against both for the foreelosure of the
mortgage. The case thus stands precisely in the
same attitude as though the wife had not in the
first instance executed the note with her husband,
but had executed the mortgage securing the same.
In such case the right to foreclose the mortgage
would scarcely be questioned. * * * While the
obligation for the payment of this debt against
both husband and wife remained enforcible, a
contract for the extension of the time of payment
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of the debt was entered into between the mortgagee and the husband alone. It was not the intention of the parties by this extension to create
a new mortgage lien on the homestead, neither
was it the intention of the parties thereto to
change the priority of the mortgage lien nor to
re-create a lien by mortgage on the homestead;
for none had been lost, destroyed or changed. The
wife not being a party to this contract, her obligation for the payment of the debt remained
wholly unaffected thereby. It neither operated
to afford her a discharge from the obligation to
pay the debt nor to release the property pledged
as security for its payment. As to her the contract of extension was wholly ineffectual to suspend the running of the statute of limitations
upon her obligation for the payment of the debt.
Her rights remained the same as though this extension agreement had not been made. It being
within the power of the husband to suspend the
running of the statute of limitations as against
himself upon his obligation to pay the debt by an
acknowledgement of a subsisting liability, therefore either by the making of payments thereon or
by an acknowledgement in writing of an existing
liability as by statute provided for tolling the
statute of limitations and as the mortgage remained enforcible so long as his obligation to pay
the debt remained enforcible in law it follows
and must be held in an action to recover the debt
and to foreclose the mortgage the statute of limitations cannot be successfully interposed by
either husband or wife to defeat the mortgage
lien so long as the right of action to recover the
debt may be maintained against either."
We refer to the case of
Skinner vs. Moore
67 Pac. (Kans.) 827
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Here payments of interest were made on the
note from time to time by the husband without
knowledge of the wife. The statute of limitations
had not run on the note against the maker (the
-husband) by reason of interest payments made
by him. The court said:
" A recovery on the note was never barred by
the statute of limitations. No one except the
husband was obligated to pay the debt evidenced
by the note. The mortgage was a conditional
conveyance securing the payment of the note so
long as it was a valid and existing demand
against the maker.''
Turning to the Mississippi reports, we find the case
of
Smith vs. Scherck
60 Miss. 491
This case involved a mortgage on a homestead executed
by both husband and wife. The court said:
" I t remains, despite the statute (the Homestead statute) the exclusive property of the husband where the legal title resides in him but with
the limitation upon the jus disponendi by which
he is prevented from selling or encumbering it
without the conjoint act of the wife. When, however, she gave her assent in the mode appointed
by law, it is operative to its full effect and can
neither be recalled nor restricted by her. When
therefore she joins in a mortgage of it to secure
a debt the property quoad the mortgage ceases
to be a homestead and is bound as any other
property of the husband would be; and as long
therefore as the debt is kept alive by him who
owes it, the mortgage remains in full force. Having consented that it might be bound for that
debt it must so continue until the debt be dis-
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charged by valid judgment or by such lapse of
time as constitutes a valid bar in behalf of the
debtor."
The State of Vermont offers us the case of
Gay's Estate vs. Hassam, et al.
24 Atl. 715
wherein the court said:
"If Naomi B. Hassam (the wife) were a
grantee of George P. Hassam, (the husband,) one
of the mortgagors, she would be affected by) the
acknowledgement thus made by him, and she is
affected in no less degree by reason of being herself one of the mortgagors. But she claims that
in equity she should be regarded as surety for the
payment of her husband's note and that under
our statute relating to joint contractors she is
not affected by the payment or acknowledgement
made by him. By joining with her husband in a
mortgage of her real estate to secure his debt she
did not become a joint contractor. She incurred
no personal liability by so doing. The statute referred to has reference to parties incurring a personal liability and has no reference to a right
of entry into house and lands."
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in the case of
Roberts vs. Roberts,
10 No. Dak. 531
88N.W. 290
uses this language:
"By executing the mortgage to secure the debt
of her husband she consented that her homestead
right should become subject to the payment of
his debt without any restrictions unless the debt
and mortgage became barred by the running of
the statute of limitations. She waived her homeDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stead right with knowledge that the husband had
the right to pay the debt and is bound by his acts
so long as her rights have not been unlawfully infringed upon. P a r t payment by the husband in a
legal manner during the life of the mortgage is
not such an act as discharges the mortgage as to
her, although it had the effect of continuing the
lien of the mortgage longer than it would otherwise have continued. * * * In this case the debt
exists so far as the husband is concerned. So
does the mortgage also, each by virtue of the payments made by the husband and were effective in
keeping the mortgage in force as to h e r . "
The same court in
Hanson vs. Branner,
204 N . W . (No. Dak.) 856
affirms the Roberts case and after quoting from the
Roberts case as we have done, uses this language:
" There is no construction that can be placed
upon this language other than that the partial
payments made by the husband extended not only
the life of the note but the life of the mortgage as
well. There is no difference between the case at
bar and the case of Roberts vs. Roberts. The
wife in both cases signed with her husband a
mortgage upon the homestead. The husband
without the knowledge of the wife made partial
payments which tolled the bar as to the note and
mortgage.''
The case of
Mahon vs. Cooley
36 Iowa 479
is in point. The mortgage was upon a homestead. It
was executed by both husband and wife. A written ac-
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knowledgment was made by the husband alone.
court says:

f

The

"The next question for our consideration involves the power of the husband by reviving the
cause of action, without the concurrence of the
wife, to keep alive the lien of the mortgage upon
the! homestead after the expiration of the period
of limitation. Defendant's counsel insist that the
instrument under which the revivor is claimed to
be effected for that purpose so far as the homestead is concerned, should be signed by the wife
as well as the husband. * * * The mortgage was
executed to secure the debt of which the note
is evidence and its lien is not released until payment or other discharge. The evidence of the indebtedness may be changed or it may be transfered to other parties, yet the mortgage will follow it and will be valid as long as the debt can be
enforced. It is then but an incident of the debt.
Its existence is measured and prolonged by the
life of the debt. These are familiar doctrines
that do not require for their support the citation
of authorities. Whatever may be the wife's interest in the homestead, she conveyed it by the
mortgage to secure the debt and it follows from
the foregoing rule that the mortgage will bind
her interest until the debt is discharged."

We also quote from
37 Corpus Juris—page 1162, Sec. 642.
"Where a wife joins her husband in a note
and mortgage, and mortgages her land to secure
it, or mortgages her land to secure his individual
note, or joins him in a mortgage of the homestead
to secure a note executed by him alone, or their
joint note, or joins in a mortgage of the husband's
land securing his individual debt for the purpose
of relinquishing dower and homestead rights
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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payments made by him will suspend the statute
as to her in respect of foreclosure of the mortgage."
We also set forth this quotation from
17 Ruling Case Law, Sec. 297, page 934
'' Thus if a husband and wife execute a mortgage on their homestead to secure the payment of
a note made by him only, his payment of interest
periodically, though without her knowledge, has
been held to stop the running of the statute."
See also:
Jones on Mortgages, Vol. 2, 8th Ed. Sec, 1536.
Under community property law the husband's acknowledgment of the mortgage debt, without knowledge
of the wife, removes the bar of the statute of limitations
and keeps the debt alive and the debt being an enforcible
claim, the lien of the mortgage remains. In applying
the foregoing rule from community property states to
the statutes of Utah, with particular reference to Section
6406, and the wife's rights thereunder, the following
similarities between the wife's right under community
property rules and under Section 6406 should be kept in
mind. In both cases:
(a) The wife must join in deed and mortgage to
release her rights in land;
(b) Her right remains inchoate during life of husband, but she takes a fee simple interest on his death if
she survives him;
(c) Her right is contingent on the fact that she
survives him;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(d) The husband can deal with the land as his
own except as to conveying or encumbering same, when
the consent of his wife is necessary.
With such similarities existing,, it is submitted that
the authorities hereinafter quoted are in point and are
of value to the court in this discussion. In
Cook vs. Stellmon
251 Pac. (Idaho) 957
the court says:
"The agreement between Stellmon, husband,
mortgagor and appellant (the mortgagee) to
postpone the date of indebtedness created no
further incumbrance on the property than already
existing. It neither enlarged nor diminished the
original obligation. It simply postponed the time
of the debt.
Investment Securities Co. vs. Manwarren
64 Kans. 636
68 Pac. 68."
See also from the State of Washington:
Catlin vs. Mills
247 Pac, 1013
47 A. L. B. 546.
We respectfully submit that the execution of the
1917 mortgage by the appellant, Nellie Luke, was exactly
the kind of a relinquishment Section 6406 contemplates.
She mortgaged her inchoate interest to secure a debt,
and during the time the debt, which was a joint and
several one, exists against any of the makers, the
lien of the mortgage operates against this inchoate
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interest. It was the joint debt of the three persons who
signed the 1917 note and it was the several debt of each
of them. It may well be barred as to appellant by lapse
of time but the joint and several obligation of Francis G.
Luke and Alice G. Luke remained, and so long as this
obligation remained enforcible just so long was this inchoate interest of the wife, Nellie Luke, pledged for
security. There is no escape from this conclusion under
the authorities cited. It will be noted that the premises
in question were burdened with a mortgage at the time
that Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke took title to the
same, and the mortgage of 1917 in which the appellant
joined specifically recited that it was a mortgage in renewal of the mortgage obligation existing against the
premises at the time Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke
became the owners of same. Nellie Luke did not become
an owner of this land. Her interest was that of a wife
only. Therefore when she signed the note in 1917 she
was not renewing any obligation of her own. She had
no title to the land. It was her husband and Alice G.
Luke who were the owners and who would naturally be
interested in securing an extension within which to pay
the mortgage indebtedness. Therefore this case clearly
is one wherein Nellie Luke relinquished and released her
inchoate dower interest for the purpose of securing the
payment of an obligation which was her husband's and
if she had never signed the 1917 note, but only the 1917
mortgage (which she did) still her inchoate interest
would be subject to the mortgage lien until her husband's
obligation was paid or barred by lapse of time.
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IV.
THE MORTGAGES AND NOTES SIGNED
BY FRANCIS G. LUKE AND ALICE G. LUKE
IN THE YEARS 1920 AND 1923 WERE RENEWAL OR EXTENSION NOTES ONLY.
41 Corpus Juris 806
5 Thompson's Eeal Property, Sec. 4711.
We do not think that this proposition can be questioned. At the time that Francis G. Luke and Alice G.
Luke took title to the mortgaged premises, it was already burdened with a mortgage in favor of respondent.
(Findings 4, 5 and 6, Abs. pages 22 and 23). At the time
of the maturity of this mortgage obligation, the mortgagee naturally required the new owners of the premises, Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke, to execute new
mortgage papers. This was in 1917 and it was this
mortgage that appellant executed, and it was at this time
she relinquished her inchoate interest as wife. The
mortgages and notes of 1920 and 1923 were under the
authorities cited, but extension agreements. The trial
court so found. (Findings 8, 9,10, 11 and 13. Abs. pages
24, 25, 26). These Findings are conclusive upon the appellate court in the present state of the record. Therefore the original obligation assumed by Francis G. Luke
and Alice G. Luke in 1917 was kept alive, not only by
the execution of these new mortgage extension papers,
but by the admitted payment of interest made by them.
Nellie Luke had relinquished in 1917 her inchoate interDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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est to assist in securing the payment of this obligation—
an obligation which admittedly was valid and enf orcible
against Francis G. Luke and Alice G. Luke at the time
of the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. The
conclusion is inescapable that the trial court was entirely
correct in making and entering its Finding No. 15 and its
Conclusion of Law No. 4. It is submitted that the judgment should in all respects be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
POWERS, RITER & COWAN,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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